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Justice and Trade Policy 
 
What trade policy should we adopt? Should we have free trade or should we impose tariffs on 
imported goods? How should we respond when other countries impose tariffs on our exports? 
How should we protect intellectual property and how should we regulate foreign investment? 
Should we seek to harmonise production and labour standards with other countries? Should 
we impose lower tariffs on goods imported from developing countries? Should we impose 
trade sanctions on governments that violate the human rights of their citizens or engage in 
unjust wars? Few of these questions are new or particularly novel, but in a world of extensive 
global economic relations, they have considerable importance. How we answer them will 
affect the lives of almost everyone. 
 In this chapter I present a normative framework for formulating these answers.  
Broadly speaking, formulating answers requires addressing two theoretical questions. The 
first is: what moral principles are pertinent to formulating trade policy? We need to know, for 
example, whether a state’s guiding consideration should be to enhance the lives of its citizens 
or whether it has duties to enhance the lives of citizens of other states or share the gains of 
trade fairly with other trading nations, or some combination, variant, or alternative to these 
ends. The second question is: how should these moral principles bear on trade policy? We 
need to know, for example, whether a demand to enhance the lives of individuals elsewhere 
asks us to shape our trade policy to this end or whether trade policy should be understood as 
part of a suite of policies that ought to realise this end together, but are not necessarily each 
directly tailored towards it. 
 Thus, I develop a framework for formulating trade policy by addressing these 
questions sequentially. After introducing some terminology in Section 1, I discuss the moral 
principles pertinent to trade policy in Section 2. In this section, I canvass recent arguments on 
 2 
 
this subject and clarify some points of difference and disagreement between them. Whilst I 
indicate a position that I find plausible, for the purposes of the chapter I proceed by 
identifying a moral principle concerned with improving the position of the less advantaged 
globally that could be shared across different accounts of trade justice, a principle consistent 
with widely shared convictions that all countries, particularly currently wealthy liberal 
democracies, have duties to assist the very badly-off in the world. In Section 3, I consider 
how this demand ought to guide trade policy. Here I defend a position I call policy-
integrationism, which holds that we should pursue such moral demands by arranging a suite 
of policies, or a ‘basic structure’, that combines to realise them, rather than focusing on 
whether any particular policy, such as trade policy, advances them directly. I mobilise this 
argument by exploring one live trade policy debate: the proposal that wealthy states ought to 
offer preferential terms of trade (such as reduced import tariffs) to developing countries that 
improve labour or living standards in their borders. The chapter endorses this proposal, but 
argues that analysis of it shows the importance of connecting trade with other policy areas. 
 
1. TRADE AND TRADE POLICY 
 
Before embarking on the major discussion of this chapter, it is useful to define some terms. 
 One common image suggested by the word ‘trade’ is two individuals exchanging 
goods. Perhaps A sells her pen to B for £1. Such an exchange can take place within or across 
the borders of a country. A similar exchange can occur between two states. For example, 
Country A might import a million pens produced in Country B, paying Country B £1million 
for them. I shall refer to these kinds of interactions as ‘transactions’. 
 I use this term to separate transactions from another image of ‘trade’ that takes a more 
structural form. Here the image of trade is a social practice with a set of rules to govern a 
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regularised pattern of transactions. In the contemporary world, this practice is characterised 
by a large number of states forming agreements covering, amongst other things, tariff 
schedules across a range of industries, the protection of intellectual property, production 
standards, and means to settle disputes regarding trade conduct. I will use the term ‘trade’ for 
arrangements of this kind. 
 Within the terrain of trade, there are, at least, two areas of ‘policy’ that might be 
subjected to moral evaluation. First, we can consider the agreements and economic stances 
states make in relation to other states, such as the tariffs they impose on goods entering their 
country and the production standards they require these goods meet. I shall call this ‘trade 
policy’. Second, we can consider the arrangements of a coordinating trade body, such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). These might include tariff and regulatory schedules the 
body demands countries adopt, negotiation protocol, and dispute settlement procedures. I 
shall call these ‘trade rules’. 
There are various ways in which transactions, trade policy, and trade rules connect 
and overlap. Trade rules may set parameters for transactions and it might be an aim of trade 
rules to harmonize trade policy. It may also be that what is defensible trade policy depends on 
the trade rules. Perhaps, for example, some trade policy is defensible only if a certain number 
of states adopt it and trade rules are an important means of ensuring this is the case. 
Nevertheless, it is useful to separate these various matters because it is possible to hold that 
different (even if, perhaps, overlapping) ethical considerations are pertinent to them. For 
instance, it can be argued that the concerns involved in transactions are largely duties that fall 
on specific actors, say not to manipulate or exploit others, whereas the more systematic, 
organised nature of trade entails a collective duty to ensure the practice treats its participants 
fairly (cf. James 2005: 537). 
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Because it sits centrally in both prominent discussions of trade and the academic 
literature, trade policy (particularly that of wealthy states) will be my main focus in this 
chapter. And with the terms delineated, we can now consider the first question posed in the 
introduction: what moral concerns might be thought pertinent to trade? 
 
2. JUSTICE AND TRADE 
 
There is a wide range of moral outlooks that might be thought to bear on trade and it is not 
possible to address them all here.1 Instead, I shall outline four major lines of argument that I 
shall call the basic rights conception, the exploitation conception, the trade fairness 
conception, and the global egalitarian conception.2 Following these summaries, I shall 
discuss some important points of difference between them. 
 
2.1. The Basic Rights Conception 
 
The first account of moral principles pertinent to trade places emphasis on a set of basic 
rights its advocates believe all individuals hold. Accounts of these rights vary, but it is a 
widespread belief that all individuals hold various civil and political rights, rights to personal 
security, and rights to a certain level of social and economic opportunities or resources (cf. 
Shue 1996). Even those who deny the relevance of some moral principles to the international 
context accept that the protection and promotion of such rights remains a universal demand 
that may have important bearing on global economic relations (cf. Blake 2001: 271; Nagel 
2005: 131-132).3 
 It is worth noting that a list of basic rights owed to all persons may be quite extensive 
(cf. Cohen 2004). However, there is a trend in literature towards arguing that trade justice 
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requires more than the protection and promotion of these rights. This trend has seen three 
prominent approaches to extending the moral demands pertinent to trade beyond it.   
 
2.2. The Exploitation Conception 
 
One such account focuses on the idea of exploitation. The conception has been most cogently 
developed by Risse (2007; 2012), Kurjanska & Risse (2008), and Risse & Wollner (2014). In 
essence, the view that runs across these texts is captured in Risse’s objection to ‘trade that 
comes at somebody’s expense’ (Risse 2012: 272). The thought here is that certain trade 
arrangements can take unfair advantage of certain actors and that such arrangements generate 
what amounts to ‘ill-gotten gains’ (Risse 2012: 272). 
 One instance of this worry concerns situations in which two countries are involved in 
trade, but the population of one country is oppressed. For example, they might be forced to 
work or have other human rights violated. In this case, Risse argues, any gains from trade that 
result from the oppression are tarnished and the ‘conditions render trade partly constitutive of 
the oppression’, giving ‘the oppressed a complaint in fairness against the trading partner’ 
(Risse 2007: 362). This concern aligns with the idea that the protection and promotion of 
basic rights is pertinent to trade, but adds a further objection focused on the distributions of 
trade’s benefits that have emerged through such oppression. 
 Another version of this worry concerns the instances in which some actors benefit 
disproportionately from trade while others benefit too little. As Risse & Wollner (2014: 217-
220) highlight, there are various ways in which the wrong here can be articulated. One 
account utilises some of the ideas canvassed in the previous section. It can be argued, for 
example, that an interaction (be it a transaction or trade) in which one actor had her rights 
violated and she receives less from the interaction as a result of this rights violation is wrong 
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not only in the rights violation it involves, but also in the distribution that results. Another 
account finds it objectionable if one actor is vulnerable and another actor utilises this 
vulnerability to benefit disproportionately from their interaction. Exploitation of these 
different kinds can involve a range of actors. An obvious case is companies that exploit the 
vulnerable position of potential workers, but it is also possible for wealthy states or large 
companies to exploit developing countries that desperately need to secure trade deals in order 
to provide opportunities or services for their populations. These concerns, Risse argues, also 
give us reason to supplement our concern for basic rights with an anti-exploitation principle, 
which holds that it is objectionable if actors’ ‘contributions to the production of goods or the 
provision of services for export do not make them better off…to an extent warranted by the 
value of these contributions’ (Risse 2012: 272).4 
 
2.3. The Trade Fairness Conception 
 
The third view I will outline here places significance on the description of trade that I 
outlined in the introduction, as an ongoing system with a set of rules and regularised patterns 
of exchange. Aaron James argues that features of this kind classify trade as a ‘social 
practice’, specifically ‘an international social practice of market reliance…in which countries 
mutually rely on common markets…for the sake of augmenting their national incomes’ 
(James 2014: 178). A practice of this kind, James argues, generates ‘requirements of 
structural equity’, which demand that ‘it distributes the benefits and burdens it creates 
according to a pattern that is reasonably acceptable to every country…affected’ (James 2014: 
179). It is in this way that James’ view extends beyond a requirement to protect and promote 




Specifically, James contends that there are three moral principles particular to trade 
(cf. James 2012: 17-18; James 2014: 180-181). First, a principle of ‘collective due care’, 
which holds that states must protect people against the harms of trade, such as unemployment 
or wage suppression. Second, a principle of ‘international relative gains’, which holds that the 
increase in global wealth attributable to trade should be divided equally amongst trading 
nations, unless a greater share is given to poorer countries. This principle suggests something 
like the application of Rawls’ difference principle (cf. Rawls 1971: 60-83) to distributing the 
gains of trade between trading states. Third, a ‘principle of domestic relative gains’, which 
holds that nations must distribute their share of the gains of trade fairly amongst their 
populations, either by dividing it equally or dividing it unequally in a way that is beneficial to 
the worst-off. This may mirror an application of the difference principle to how countries 
distribute their share internally. 
 
2.4. The Global Egalitarian Conception 
 
The final conception to outline has some similarities to the trade fairness conception, but has 
a broader and more demanding understanding of these distributive requirements. The global 
egalitarian conception holds that we should distribute a wider set of resources or 
opportunities, including, but not limited to, the gains of trade, according to an egalitarian 
principle. For example, this could require that these goods are distributed so that all 
individuals or states have equal shares or allowing inequalities that benefit the worse-off, the 
latter reflecting a global difference principle that applies not directly how we should 
distribute the gains of trade (as James’ international relative gains principle does), but 
considers these gains part of a set of goods to which the principle should be applied together. 
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 One version of this view is a global institutionalist account. On this account, the 
egalitarian distributive principle has bearing given the extent and nature of contemporary 
global relations. There is a similarity here to James’ claim that egalitarian moral principles 
arise in the context of social practices of some kind. The difference is that the global 
egalitarian conception holds the relevant context to be a broader institutional context, such as 
the context of a global basic structure that, in a similar way to many states, regulates various 
aspects of political life, ranging from trade to environmental protection to war. It holds that it 
is the existence of such a basic structure that raises a requirement to distribute resources or 
opportunities fairly amongst those who live under it, perhaps because its affects are so 
‘profound and pervasive’ or because it is the relevant locus of reciprocal, coercive, or non-
voluntary relations, and that, because our contemporary global architecture constitutes a basic 
structure, this requirement applies to our world (Beitz 1999; Walton 2009; Walton 2014). 
 A somewhat different account is a non-institutional cosmopolitan view. On this 
account, the existence of institutional contexts is not pertinent to the application of a 
requirement to distribute resources or opportunities in an egalitarian fashion. Rather, 
individuals worldwide are entitled to an egalitarian share of resources or opportunities 
regardless of their institutional affiliations (Caney 2005: 102-147). 
 On either of these versions of the global egalitarian conception, transactions or trade 
take a somewhat secondary role. To some extent, the argument for global egalitarian 
principles might be pressed regardless of their existence. Nevertheless, it is clear that such 
principles would have bearing on these matters. Because transactions and trade constitute 
certain kinds of opportunities and generate and distribute certain goods, there is a connection 
between them and the realisation of these principles. Thus, this final view amounts to positing 




2.5. Disagreements and a Shared Concern 
 
Perhaps it will be clear that these conceptions are not necessarily in tension with one another, 
at least not completely. One could hold that the moral concerns pertinent to trade include 
respect for basic rights, a rejection of exploitation, and a demand that the gains of trade are 
distributed fairly. Nevertheless, there are certain ways in which these views come apart. 
A main area of disagreement reflects a dispute that pervades the wider literature on 
global justice concerning the foundations of (certain) moral principles. Essentially, the main 
question here is: what “gives rise” to a requirement to distribute goods in an egalitarian 
fashion? As noted above, some views hold that certain kinds of social or institutional context 
must exist before this requirement has bearing. Non-institutional cosmopolitans disagree with 
this claim (cf. Caney 2005: 111). Advocates of the basic rights conception hold that the 
existence of some such context is important and that the relevant kind of context does not 
exist at the global level (Blake 2001; Nagel 2005). Advocates of the exploitation conception, 
the trade fairness conception, and the global institutionalist version of the global egalitarian 
conception agree about the importance of some such context existing, but claim that the 
relevant kind of context does exist at the global level. However, advocates of these views 
differ on what constitutes the relevant kind of context. Advocates of the exploitation 
conception and the trade fairness conception hold that it is trade that gives rise to such 
principles (cf. James 2012; Risse 2012), whereas advocates of the global institutionalist view 
hold that it is a global basic structure that gives rise to them (Walton 2009; Walton 2014). 
There are also disagreements on exactly which principles have bearing on trade. 
Although it is possible to hold a view that combines many of the concerns mentioned above, 
few authors do hold such a view. Those who endorse the basic rights conception, generally 
do not endorse the concern for egalitarian principles, and many seem not to endorse the 
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exploitation concern either. Some advocacy of the exploitation conception is partly in the 
vein of denying that broader egalitarian principles have bearing (cf. Risse & Wollner 2013: 
393-400; Risse & Wollner 2014: 205-208). Meanwhile, James’ argument for egalitarian 
principles of trade fairness is made (partly) in challenge to those who hold that only basic 
rights are pertinent to trade and those who endorse broader global egalitarian principles 
(James 2012: 6-14) and those who endorse the global egalitarian conception tend to reject 
narrower egalitarian principles that concern only the distribution of gains from trade (Walton 
2014; Walton forthcoming).5 
Whilst resolving these disagreements, and considering how they relate to other 
considerations, such as efficiency or national security, that might bear on trade, are important 
tasks for articulating a complete theory of trade justice, I will set them aside here in order to 
explore the other question raised in the introduction: how should moral principles should be 
used to guide the formulation of trade policy? This question can be explored somewhat 
independently. For this reason, to avoid prejudicing the discussion towards a particular 
conception I focus on a moral concern that bears some relation to each of them. This concern 
is nicely expressed by Barry and Reddy as ‘improving the level of advantage of less 
advantaged persons in the world’ (Barry & Reddy 2008: 3). Although this does not stress the 
idea of basic rights directly, it follows the spirit of this conception in aiming to assist the 
badly-off in the world, and it is a concern that the other conceptions also accept in some form 
or other. Thus, it can serve to consider how a principle should be used to shape trade policy. 
 
3. JUSTICE AND TRADE POLICY 
 
Although it might seem that this chapter has already begun considering how to theorise trade 
policy, it is important to see a gap between what has been discussed and this further question. 
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Joseph Raz captures the essence of this gap in his comment that ‘political theory can 
conveniently be divided into two parts: a political morality and a theory of institutions’ Raz 
1986: 3). ‘Political morality consists in the principles which should guide political action’, 
Raz continues, and, then, these principles are ‘the basis on which the theory of institutions 
constructs arguments for having political institutions of this character rather than that’ (Raz 
1986: 3). In short, we should separate two aspects of theorising. First, there is a task of 
determining the moral principles that give us the aims of justice. Second, there is a task of 
using these principles to guide a process of determining which institutions to adopt. 
 Occasionally these tasks are run together or the lines between them are blurred. It is 
plausible to believe that this assimilation has occurred in thinking about trade. It is quite 
straightforward to move from thinking that we should aim to improve the position of less 
advantaged persons to the thought that trade policy should be used to promote this aim, 
especially if it would be a productive means of doing so. It is perhaps even easier to move 
between the idea that the gains of trade ought to be distributed in a fashion that treats trade’s 
participants fairly and the idea that trade ought to be structured in a fashion that achieves this 
goal. But Raz’s distinction should encourage us to see that articulating a theory of how 
principles should guide institutional design forms a necessary step between specifying a 
political morality and reaching conclusions about which policies we ought to adopt. There are 
various ways to approach this task. For the purposes of discussion here, I outline two. 
The policy-isolationist approach holds that we ought to select policy by a criterion of 
which one best directly advances the moral standards of concern. Although I shall suggest 
that they do not fully adopt a policy-isolationist approach, the basic thrust of the position 
appears in Barry & Reddy’s approach when they propose that a significant determinant of 
whether to select one policy or trade arrangement over another is ‘whether it improves the 
level of advantage of less advantaged persons in the world to a greater extent’ (Barry & 
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Reddy 2008: 3). To see what this approach suggests, consider two trade policies. Trade 
Policy 1 is to set high trade tariffs on imports from countries where the less advantaged are 
particularly badly off. Trade Policy 2 is to set low tariffs on imports from these countries. Let 
us imagine that Trade Policy 1 more effectively enhances the position of those less 
advantaged persons. The policy-isolationist approach, as captured by Barry & Reddy’s 
proposal, would conclude that we should adopt Trade Policy 1. 
 This contrasts with the policy-integrationist approach, which holds that we ought to 
choose between trade policies by exploring how they combine with a wider array of policies 
and institutions to realise the moral standards of concern and selecting the set that would be 
most effective together. As an example, consider the two trade policies mentioned above. But 
now consider them alongside two aid policies. Aid Policy 1 gives low levels of aid to 
countries where the less advantaged are particularly badly off and Aid Policy 2 gives high 
levels of aid to these countries. For the sake of argument, imagine that, when considered 
alone, Aid Policy 1 is more effective in improving the position of the less advantaged. But 
imagine that, through some type of compound effect, Trade Policy 1 and Aid Policy 1 
combine more poorly than Trade Policy 2 and Aid Policy 2. Perhaps, for example, when only 
one policy area is considered, a cold shoulder approach is effective in improving the position 
of the less advantaged due to its symbolic tone, but when this approach is taken across a 
series of domains, it generates hostility and backlash. Whereas, the more benevolent policies 
are ineffective in any individual case, but more effective when part of a comprehensive 
programme of friendly encouragement. The policy-integrationist approach places its focus 
on how policies work in conjunction in this fashion and selects the set that produce the best 
effects. In the suggested analysis, it recommends adopting Trade Policy 2 and Aid Policy 2, 
even though both of these policies seem sub-optimal when considered in isolation. 
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 Although recent trade justice literature has offered various policy recommendations, 
my sense is that which of these approaches is employed has not been made explicit or 
defended. Thus, in what remains of this chapter, I shall now explore what arguments can be 
made in favour of each, beginning with the approach that I think is the more plausible. 
 
3.1. Defending Policy-Integrationism 
 
The case for policy-integrationism rests on the consideration that moral demands are 
commonly best addressed by multifaceted strategies that harness the combined effect of 
various policies. For this reason, assessing policies in isolation can misidentify good policy 
options, in a way that is avoided if we consider them in an integrationist fashion. 
 The plausibility of these claims can be demonstrated by working through some 
dimensions of a live policy debate in global trade concerning the following proposal:  
 
Qualified Market Access: Wealthy states ought to grant preferential market access (in 
the form of reduced trade tariffs, for example) to developing countries that improve 
labour standards in their borders.6 
 
 The basic case for Qualified Market Access is straightforward (cf.  Stiglitz & Charlton 
2005: 177; Barry & Reddy 2008: 30-33). Granting developing countries preferential access to 
the markets of wealthy states improves the former’s economic prospects. It, thereby, sets an 
incentive and a realisable benefit to them. Meanwhile, tying this access to the improvements 
in labour standards means that obtaining this benefit moves alongside enhancement in wages, 
health and safety standards, and the protection of rights to collective bargaining and against 
forced or compulsory labour.7 Improvements in these standards in developing countries 
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plausibly would advance the position of the less advantaged in the world who currently work 
in low paid, unsafe, unsanitary, and insecure jobs in these countries. 
It is possible to argue that the focus of Qualified Market Access should be broadened. 
Perhaps rather than labour standards, the proposal should focus on living standards, thereby 
ensuring improvements affect those outside employment or in less formal employment too. 
But the case for the proposal would hold in this guise too. 
The difficulty with the case begins to appear when the effects of it in practice are 
considered. As Stiglitz and Charlton (2005: 177-183 & 191-193) note, the use and benefit of 
some existing trade preference schemes has been relatively low. There might be various 
reasons for this, but one appears to be a difficulty that faces developing countries’ 
compliance with many WTO regulations: that adjusting to such regulations involve costs, 
including establishing new laws or conventions and their correlate accounting, monitoring, 
and enforcement systems. Although these sound minor concerns, they tend to be quite 
significant for poorer countries, which require greater adjustments to comply with these 
regulations and whose legal and bureaucratic apparatus are less developed. 
Another argument is that using trade preference schemes linked to improving labour 
standards undermines one of the main economic advantages of developing countries (Barry & 
Reddy 2008: 36). Specifically, the thought is that developing countries have a comparative 
advantage grounded in the labour-intensive fashion they can produce goods given their lower 
labour standards. If labour standards are improved, production costs in these countries 
increase. The worry, then, is that they lose their comparative advantage and their goods are 
not competitive in international markets. There may also be a concern that it becomes 
unattractive for business to operate in these locations and these businesses relocate. 
There is a way that both of these difficulties can be addressed. As Stiglitz & Charlton 
(2005: 204-208) note in relation to adjustment costs, it would be possible to offset these 
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difficulties by programmes that offer developing countries assistance in reforming their 
systems. Similarly, as Barry & Reddy (2008: 37-40) note, it can be shown that there need be 
no loss in developing countries’ comparative advantage if the additional production costs 
associated with improvements in labour standards are offset by wage subsidies, most 
plausibly financed by resource transfers from wealthier states. 
But these points indicate precisely the case for policy-integrationism. When 
considered in isolation, it is not obvious that we should adopt Qualified Market Access. Given 
the difficulties noted above, it is not clear that this proposal would be better than current trade 
policies (or free trade or symmetric market access) for improving the position of the less 
advantaged. Thus, a policy-isolationist approach would not have reason to endorse the 
proposal. But here we have an example of misidentifying good policy options. It is a 
misidentification because when considered in conjunction with supplementary policies, such 
as adjustment programmes or resource transfers, the case for adopting Qualified Market 
Access, as part of this set, appears convincing. In short, it is through a policy-integrationist 
approach that the merits of the proposal and the most coherent policy selection becomes 
clear. 
This point should not be particularly surprising. That the realisation of various aims 
typically requires using a range of, often diverse, policy levers is well-established in other 
areas of public policy, particularly health care (cf. Wolff 2011: 128-146). It also has 
resonance with other areas of trade policy. For example, research on reducing child labour 
consistently shows that attempting to address the problem via one lever is less effective than 
adopting a multifaceted strategy (cf. Satz 2010: 162-169). 
 Making the point in general theoretical terms, John Rawls argues that we should 
‘distinguish between a single rule…, an institution…, and the basic structure of the social 
system as a whole’ (Rawls 1971: 57). ‘The reason for doing this’, he argues, ‘is that one or 
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several rules of an arrangement may be unjust without the institution itself being so’, for 
example when ‘single rules and institutions are not by themselves sufficiently important’ to 
effect or determine the quality of the overall system (Rawls 1971: 57). 
 What has been argued here supports Rawls’ view by highlighting that, on many 
occasions, we cannot properly grasp whether a policy should be thought just without 
reflecting on how it combines with other policies. Given the way in which the realisation of 
moral demands depends on how multiple policies from a range of domains combine, it is 
valuable to think about responding to the moral concerns pertinent to trade by reflecting on 
how trade policy can be used as part of a suite of policies. We should, in short, approach 
trade policy selection by a method of policy-integrationism. 
 
3.2. Alternatives to Policy-Integrationism 
 
In what remains of this chapter, I will consider two lines of argument in the trade justice 
literature that might contest the policy-integrationism that has been defended above and 
point, rather, to a case for policy-isolationism. 
 The first argument concerns whether policy-integrationism is not properly sensitive to 
the nature of certain moral demands. Consider the case of forced labour. This practice 
remains disturbingly common and is present, despite being condemned, in global supply 
chains that are under the purview of our trade policy and trade rules (International Labour 
Organization 2017). We can imagine a trade policy that does not directly prohibit this 
practice. Perhaps our strategy for eradicating it is funnelled through our diplomatic policy, on 
the grounds, suggested above, that it is more effectively pursued this way than by tailoring 
trade policy to the end. Still, we may worry about such a trade policy. It might be argued that 
the structure of our normative concern with forced labour takes the form of a side-constraint 
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that ought to be respected, rather than a goal that ought to be promoted. In this regard, there 
might be a concern that the policy-integrationism approach is objectionably consequentialist, 
allowing or engaging in side-constraint violations, even if for the sake of maximising their 
protection overall. It may be thought that it is misaligned with what trade policy ought to 
regulate, focusing on how the combination of policies affect individuals overall rather than 
regulating the particular duties of particular actors towards particular others, such as those of 
companies to their workers. It could also be argued that focusing on the system rather than 
the particular components does not adequately take into account the nature of the wrong as it 
is experienced by those who suffer it or as it is perpetrated (cf. Goff forthcoming). In any of 
these ways, it might be argued that a policy-isolationist approach, focused on tailoring trade 
policy to regulate the precise duties of actors, is better attuned to the nature of, at least, some 
moral concerns pertinent to trade. 
 A response to these worries is to clarify that policy-integrationism should not be 
thought any more consequentialist than policy-isolationism. As noted above, it is a theory of 
how principles should be used to guide policy, not a theory of those principles. Thus, it is also 
concerned with regulating the particular duties of particular actors to other actors, if that is 
what the relevant moral principles demand. Its demarcating feature lies in holding that we 
should consider how these duties are regulated by a combination of policies, rather than by 
particular policies. What this position entails is not that our trade policy can engage in side-
constraint violations or neglect the duties of companies to their workers if these wrongs are 
offset by the positives of our diplomatic policy. What it entails is that we should align our 
trade and diplomatic policies to ensure that these side-constraints and duties are properly 
respected. If it endorses using diplomatic policy, rather than trade policy, to combat forced 
labour, that is because doing so ensures that we do not violate side-constraints and that 
companies fulfil their duties to workers. The correct image, I think, is not one of doing the 
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right thing ‘on balance’, but one of meeting the precise moral demands through whichever 
course of action best ensures they are met. In this respect, I think that concerns about the 
nature of relevant moral demands do not split, or, therefore, arbitrate between, the two 
approaches to policy formulation considered here. 
 A second line of argument to consider draws upon a theme mentioned in the 
discussion of conceptions of trade justice above. A prominent argument in this literature is 
that different social practices have moral principles particular to them. It can also be thought 
that we should particularise how the policies or structures of these institutions are guided. 
Different arguments can be advanced for this view. It could be argued that trade is a separate 
or discreet domain of global politics, constituting a distinct social practice, that should be 
governed according to its own unique directives (cf. James 2012: 154-155). It can also be 
argued that the nature of current global politics in general is complex and patchwork and that 
to devise concrete guidance for any component, it makes practical and epistemic sense to 
think about its regulation in a particularised fashion rather than attempt to determine how an 
immense array of disjointed policies work together (cf. de Bres 2013). On these accounts 
perhaps there is reason to approach trade policy in a way that treats it more as a silo. 
 A response to this thought is to deny that trade can plausibly be treated as a separable 
sphere of global politics. Empirically, it can be argued that trade is very much entwined with 
other areas of policy, ranging from its connection to aid and resource transfers as discussed 
above to its connection to environmental protection in cap-and-trade emissions schemes and 
security in the use of economic sanctions to resolve civil and international conflicts (Walton 
2014). This existing interconnection between domains suggests that it is both feasible and 
practical to formulate policy in an integrated fashion and, indeed, is often deemed important 
in global politics because it is conducive to forming agreements to consider various domains 
of interstate relations simultaneously or as a unified package (cf. Caney 2012: 278-280) and it 
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can help with enforcement and long-term cooperation (cf. Barry & Reddy 2008: 52-53). 
Normatively, it can be argued that the shape and effects of policies in these areas is pertinent 
to whether policies in other areas are just, because, for example, distributions of trade’s 
benefits can be morally tarnished if they arise from injustices such as colonialism or the 
overuse of the world’s resources or if they aggregate with the distributions of other goods to 
form significant overall inequalities between individuals or states (Walton forthcoming). In 
each of these respects, far from thinking that we should understand particularised normative 
principles or guidance as valuable for formulating trade policy, we should consider global 




In essence, the central theme of this chapter is that thinking about justice in relation to trade 
and trade policy should not be limited to thinking about justice in relation to trade or trade 
policy alone. This theme emerged partly in discussion of the moral principles that bear on 
trade and was the main argument of how moral principles should be used to guide trade 
policy. As I noted, the point has bearing beyond trade. Insofar as health policy is one policy 
area amongst many that affect health and health is one moral concern amongst others in a 
theory of justice, formulating health policy is sensibly approached through consideration of 
its relation to these other matters. No doubt a similar argument can be made about policy for 
education, housing, labour markets, environmental protection, immigration, and so on, and 
this points in the direction of understanding these areas as components of a broader, cohesive 
whole. I have not had space to defend this more generalised thesis here. But the chapter has 
provided a rationale for this kind of integrationism that can be applied to these other areas 
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and developed in this way, and, if nothing else, shown why this framework is suitable for 
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1 Another overview of the trade justice literature is de Bres (2016). 
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2 One account I do not consider is a libertarian account, which would hold that our rights to our person and 
property require allowing individuals to transact freely with each other (cf. Nozick, 1974). This view identifies 
no concern distinctive to trade and is not a major thread in current literature on the latter, so I set it aside. 
3 Rawls (1999) also endorses this view. For an outline of the Rawlsian account see Walton (2015). 
4 For discussion of how the gains of transactions can be divided fairly see Miller (2016). 
5 Albeit with a slightly different focus, Christensen (2015) also argues that principles of trade justice must take 
account of broader moral concerns. 
6 An overview of qualified market access and its application in the European Union’s GSP+ scheme can be 
found in Herzog & Walton (2014). A version of the idea is also employed in Fair Trade (cf. Walton 2010). 
Thus, questions similar to those in this chapter can be asked about whether the aim of improving the position of 
the less advantaged gives individuals a reason to purchase Fair Trade goods, on which see Walton (2012; 2013). 
7 The system may also reduce the incentive and feasibility of lowering labour standards to gain a comparative 
advantage. 
8 For comments and discussion of the ideas in this chapter, I thank Derek Bell, Ali Emre Benli, Sarah Goff, 
Peter Jones, Beth Kahn, Graham Long, Erin Nash, Ian O’Flynn, Jo Swaffield and an audience at the Newcastle 
University Political Philosophy Seminar Series. 
